

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

A HISTORICAL FICTION IN VITRUVIUS

In the second book of *De architectura* Vitruvius reports an incident of fourth-century Rhodian history that is otherwise unknown in the sources (2. 8. 14–15):

Itaque post mortem Mausoli Artemisiam uxorem eius regnantem Rhodii indignantes mulierem imperare civitatibus Cariae totius, armata classe profecti sunt, uti id regnum occuparent. Tum Artemisiae cum esset id renuntiatum, in eo portu abstrusam classem celatis remigibus et epibatis comparatis, reliquos autem cives in muro esse iussit. Cum autem Rhodii ornata classe in portum maiorem exposuissent, plausum iussit ab muro his darent pollicerique se oppidum tradituros. Qui cum penetravissent intra murum relictis navibus inanibus, Artemisia repente fosse facta in pelagum eduxit classem ex portu minore et ita invecta est in maiorem. Expositis autem militibus classem Rhodiorum inanem abduxit in altum. Ita Rhodii non habentes, quo se reciperent, in medio conclusi in ipso foro sunt trucidati. Ita Artemisia in navibus Rhodiorum suis militibus et remigibus inpositis Rhodum est profecta. Rhodii autem, cum prospexissent suas naves laureatas venire, opinantes cives victores reverti hostes receperunt. Tum Artemisia Rhodo capta principibus occisis tropaeum in urbem Rhodo suae victoriae constituit aeneasque duas statuas fecit, unam Rhodiorum civitatis, alteram suae imaginis, et ita figuravit Rhodiorum civitati stigmata inponentem. Id autem postea Rhodii religione inpediti, quod nefas est tropaea dedicata removeri, circa eum locum aedificium struxerunt et id erecta Graia statione texerunt, ne qui possit aspicere, et id *abaton* vocitari iusserunt.

This abortive Rhodian campaign, which would have taken place between the years 353/352 and 351/350,¹ has been accepted by virtually every writer whose work touches on it.² The only point of debate has been whether the attack preceded or followed the Rhodian democrats' appeal to Athens.³ Close examination, however, shows enough difficulties with Vitruvius' account to justify its rejection,

1. Diod. 16. 36. 2, 45. 7; Pliny *NH* 36. 4. 30, 6. 47 (wrong date). For the chronology of the Hecatomnids, see W. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien* (Marburg, 1892), pp. 226–32; K. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*², vol. 3.2 (Berlin, 1922), pp. 143–45; H. Metzger–E. Laroche–A. Dupont-Sommer, "La stèle trilingue récemment découverte au Létéon de Xanthos," *CRAI*, 1974, pp. 82–93, 115–25, 132–49 (the last presents some new ideas on Hecatomnid chronology, but they have no real bearing on the question at hand).

2. J. Schneiderwirth, *Geschichte der Insel Rhodos* (Heiligenstadt, 1868), pp. 30–31; Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, p. 248; idem, s.v. "Artemisia (3)," *RE* 2.2 (1896): 1441; H. van Gelder, *Geschichte der alten Rhodier* (The Hague, 1900), p. 94; U. Kahrstedt, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des ausgehenden fünften und des vierten Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1910), p. 114; L. Büchner, s.v. "Halikarnassos," *RE* 7.2 (1912): 2259; Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.*², 3.1: 487; F. Hiller von Gaertringen, s.v. "Rhodos," *RE*, supp. 5 (1931): 775; A. Momigliano "Note sulla storia di Rodi," *RIFC* 14 (1936): 54–57; A. T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago, 1948), pp. 433–34; G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, "The Halicarnassus Peninsula," *ABSA* 50 (1955): 87, 89, 97, n. 85; G. Bockisch, "Die Karer und ihre Dynasten," *Klio* 51 (1969): 162–63; G. E. Bean, *Turkey Beyond the Meander* (London, 1971), pp. 106–7; J. B. Bury and R. Meiggs, *A History of Greece*⁴ (New York, 1975), p. 420. The only doubt is found in P. M. Fraser and G. E. Bean, *The Rhodian Peraea and Islands* (Oxford, 1954), p. 100, n. 1: "The story . . . may well be apocryphal"; and P. M. Fraser, "Notes on Two Rhodian Institutions," *ABSA* 67 (1972): 123, n. 68: "the historicity of this event is very open to doubt."

3. Dem. 15; see for example Momigliano, "Storia di Rodi" pp. 54–57, whose arguments are quite convincing, if one assumes the attack ever took place at all.

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either as a complete fabrication or, at least, as a gross exaggeration of some historical incident.

In the first place, the story presumes the existence at Rhodes of an internal revolution, whether democratic or oligarchic, of which there is no word in the sources. Rhodian domestic affairs had certainly been lively since the synoecism of the island under oligarchic direction in 408/407. The democrats first gained the government in 395; and, although the exact outcome of the civil war of 390–388 is unclear, Rhodes was surely democratic at the time of her revolt from the Second Athenian League in 357.⁴ Like the revolt from Sparta in 396, the secession from the Athenian League was not immediately accompanied by an internal revolution—Demosthenes' oration *On the Liberty of the Rhodians* clearly indicates the responsibility of the democrats for the revolt⁵—but the oligarchic reaction was not long in coming. At the conclusion of the war, probably in the course of 355/354, Mausolus of Caria, who had aided the rebels in their struggle, was able to engineer an anti-democratic coup. With the support of a Carian garrison, a narrow oligarchic clique led by Agesilochus became the ruling power and instrument of Carian domination on the island.⁶

That this oligarchic group would, for no apparent reason, turn against the dynasty which had put it in power and maintained it is not credible. Therefore, it is necessary, if one is to accept Vitruvius' story, to postulate a counter-revolution during the period 354–351/350. A democratic reaction would perhaps be more likely, but a movement for independence led by moderate oligarchs would also be possible; it was in fact the oligarchic Diagorids who had led the island in revolt from Sparta in 396.⁷ But the character of the revolution is irrelevant; what is important is that, for an attack on Halicarnassus to have occurred, the puppet government of Agesilochus must first have been toppled. Agesilochus and his group were probably widely unpopular because they were the direct instrument of foreign domination and because their behavior was tyrannical and scandalous;⁸ their survival depended on retaining the Carian support which kept them in power. At the same time, it is hardly possible that, in asserting their independence from Caria,

4. 408/407: Diod. 13. 75. 1; Strabo 14. 2. 10–11 (654–55); Aristid. 43 (816–17 Dindorf); Eust. *ad Il.* 2. 656 (315); Conon *Narr.* 47. 395: *Hell. Oxy.* 10 (15). 1–3; Paus. 6. 7. 6; see also I. Bruce, "The Democratic Revolution at Rhodes," *CQ* 55 (1961): 166–70; idem, *An Historical Commentary on the "Hellenica Oxyrhynchia"* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 66–101. 390–388: Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 20–25, 30; Diod. 14. 97. 1–4, 99. 4–5. Xenophon's version seems preferable: (1) he had excellent sources through the Spartans; (2) he would have been directly interested in the activities of Teletias, who was Agesilaus' brother; and (3) four years seems too short a time for the oligarchs to regroup and succeed in ejecting the democrats from the city. For the opposing view, see G. Busolt, "Der zweite athenische Bund," *Jahrb. f. klass. Phil.*, supp. 7 (1873–75): 671–73. In any case, once the Spartan fleet had left (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 2–6), the democrats, possibly with Athenian help, could overwhelm the outnumbered oligarchs; Isoc. 4. 163 indicates that Rhodes was not under Spartan control ca. 380. On these events and their chronology, see Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, pp. 89–92, 97–98. Democratic in 357: Dem. 13. 8–9; 15. 17–21, 28. On the revolt, see Busolt, "Der zweite athenische Bund," pp. 853–59; F. H. Marshall, *The Second Athenian Confederacy* (Cambridge, 1905), pp. 109–114.

5. Dem. 15. 15, 21.

6. Dem. 13. 8; 15. 3, 14–15, 19, 27–28. Ath. 10. 444E–445A. Lucian *Dial. Mort.* 29. 1 (429). I believe Arist. *Pol.* 5. 1302b27–31 and 1304b27–31 refer to this period; Momigliano, "Storia di Rodi," pp. 53–54, thinks the passages refer to 391 and support Diodorus' version of those events.

7. Many authors link the revolt with the democratic revolution (e.g., Van Gelder, *Geschichte der alten Rhodier*, p. 85; N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.*² [Oxford, 1967], p. 455), but the *Hell. Oxy.* shows clearly that the revolution took place after Conon had been admitted to the harbor; see n. 4.

8. Ath. 10. 444E–445A.

the Rhodians would have retained the oppressive government that had been imposed upon them by Mausolus.

So a revolution is necessary, but there is not the slightest sign of one. Diodorus, who gives at least brief mention of every other known instance of *stasis* at Rhodes and who was certainly familiar with eastern affairs for this period,⁹ says nothing about a revolution or an assault on Halicarnassus. Moreover, if a revolution had occurred at Rhodes before 351, Demosthenes could reasonably be expected to have made reference to it in his speech. Arguments from silence are far from convincing, but they do have a cumulative force when, as in this instance, there are other difficulties inherent in the story. Consider an important point: if there was a revolution, how was the Carian garrison dealt with? Certainly the Hecatomnids, and even more so Agesilochus and his circle, whose very lives depended upon this body of soldiers,¹⁰ would have taken care that the garrison was kept in readiness and strength. Barring outside interference, such garrisons were generally sufficient to secure the loyalty of a subject city; and it is hard to see how the Rhodians, without the aid of a foreign power, could easily have disposed of these troops.¹¹ The garrison, after all, need only have held out for the relatively short time necessary for the call for help to reach Halicarnassus and reinforcements to be sent to the island. Walther Judeich proposed that the Rhodians took advantage of the change of government in Caria in 353/352;¹² but the succession there was completely trouble free, and it could in no way have affected the situation on Rhodes. The revolution necessary as a precursor to the raid on Halicarnassus is thus unattested in the sources and, given the presence of the Carian garrison, inherently unlikely.

Even if it is assumed that the Rhodians did manage to overthrow the puppet government and gain control of the island, it must also be assumed that they were complete fools for then launching an attack on Halicarnassus. There are no figures for the Rhodian fleet during this period, but it must have been of less than impressive size. For the past century and a half various powers had levied money and ships from the island, but there is no mention of a Rhodian squadron of any significant strength.¹³ During the Social War Rhodes contributed to the rebel fleet of one hundred sail, but her squadron must have been relatively small, since among the other contributors were the powerful naval states of Byzantium, Chios, and Caria itself.¹⁴ It is true that later, in the second century, Rhodes could in a single year launch a fleet of seventy-five warships;¹⁵ but the island was also inestimably more wealthy in the Hellenistic period than in the fourth century, and even in the Hellenistic period she generally maintained war fleets of no more than thirty vessels.¹⁶ Equipping and maintaining a large fleet was expensive business, and the fre-

9. Diod. 13. 38. 5, 45. 1; 14. 79. 6, 97. 1-4, 96. 4-5.

10. Democrats had murdered the oligarchic Diagorids in the wake of the revolution of 395 (*Hell. Oxy.* 10[15]. 2); Agesilochus and his group must have been even more unpopular with both oligarchs and democrats.

11. The Rhodians expelled without outside aid their Macedonian garrison when Alexander died in 323 (Diod. 18. 8. 1), but at that time they were no longer politically divided, and the Macedonian leaders were distracted by the Lamian War and the general scramble for power in the empire.

12. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, p. 248.

13. In 480 the "Dorians living off Caria, together with the Rhodians and Coans" contributed forty ships to Xerxes' fleet: Diod. 11. 3. 8.

14. Diod. 16. 7. 3, 21. 2.

15. In 190 against Antiochus III: Livy 37. 9. 5, 12. 9, 16. 3, 22. 3-4.

16. See C. Torr, *Rhodes in Ancient Times* (Cambridge, 1885), pp. 39-40.

quent hostilities between Greece and Persia and the constant interventions and exactions of foreign powers had not allowed development of that prosperity which the island's commercially strategic position would bring after the death of Alexander. It is unlikely then that, in the days immediately following the Social War, Rhodes could have manned a fleet of more than thirty vessels, and even a squadron of this size would have placed a heavy burden on Rhodian finances.¹⁷

Mausolus, on the other hand, had a strong economic base in his control of Caria, parts of Lycia and Ionia, and neighboring islands; and his essentially maritime policy would have dictated the maintenance of the strongest possible naval forces.¹⁸ In 366 the dynast commanded a fleet of one hundred ships; and, following the Social War and his acquisition of Cos and Rhodes, he would have had still more reason to support a strong fleet.¹⁹ The Athenians must have been unhappy about the loss of allies and the expansion of Carian power at their expense, and the Rhodian democrats could be expected to seek aid from their former mistress and her strong navy. In what is known of his rule, Mausolus demonstrated that he was a clever and capable man; and, even if his aim was only to guarantee a minimum of security for his state and its possessions after the Social War, he must have seen the necessity of maintaining a marine far stronger than anything the Rhodians could deal with alone. Vitruvius' raid took place during the reign of Artemisia, but she seems to have been a worthy successor to her brother and husband. Inasmuch as Carian power continued undisturbed after her death, it may be safely assumed that her reign saw no weakening of her husband's policies.²⁰

Finally, in addition to the Carian navy, there was the city of Halicarnassus itself, a stronghold which had excellent fortifications and which would later slow Alexander on his march south.²¹ Even assuming the absence of the enemy fleet, how did the Rhodians expect to capture the city, except by surprise, a doubtful undertaking given the existence of a pro-Carian party on the island? Could they really

17. In 416 it cost sixty talents to pay the crews of sixty triremes for a month (Thuc. 6. 8. 1); this figure had undoubtedly increased by the 350s. The only figures on Rhodian finances before the Hellenistic period are from the tribute lists of the first Athenian empire, which show the total payment for the island as consistently less than thirty talents: see R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 554–55. The synoecism surely aided the economic growth of Rhodes; nevertheless, two years of war against Athens, followed by the financial exactions of Mausolus (on the character of his rule, see Polyae. 7. 23. 1; Arist. *Oec.* 2. 1348a–b), could not have left the Rhodians with much of a financial reserve. Athens herself was having increasing difficulty supporting her fleet; see generally Busolt, "Der zweite athenische Bund," pp. 821–53.

18. On Mausolus and the Hecatomnids in general, see Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, pp. 232–55; idem, s.v. "Ada," *RE* 1.1 (1893): 339, and s.v. "Artemisia (3)," cols. 1441–42. Kahrstedt, s.v. "Idrieus (2)," *RE* 9.1 (1914): 912; s.v. "Karia (1)," *RE* 10.2 (1919): 1943–47; and s.v. "Mausolus (2)," *RE* 14.2 (1930): 2414–16. J. Miller, s.v. "Pixodorus (3)," *RE* 20.2 (1950): 1894. Bockisch, "Die Karer," pp. 117–75.

19. 366: Xen. *Ages.* 2. 26; perhaps an exaggeration to make Agesilaus look better, but Xenophon's figures are generally accurate. Cos and Rhodes: see n. 6; G. F. Hill, "Some Coins of Southern Asia Minor," in *Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir W. M. Ramsay*, ed. by W. H. Buckler and W. M. Calder (Manchester, 1923), pp. 207–9. It is not clear when Chios was taken, but it was probably later; see Büchchner, s.v. "Chios (1)," *RE* 3.2 (1899): 2297.

20. Dem. 5. 25 must refer to Artemisia's successor Idrieus (ἐῶμεν . . . τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, *Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον*); but this is not evidence that Rhodes had broken away and was reconquered. The principle verb ἐῶ is in the present, making it unlikely that καταλαμβάνειν can refer to a single past act of seizure, an interpretation that is supported by the position of the clause, sandwiched between two others which clearly refer to continuous actions. καταλαμβάνειν may thus be understood in the sense of a continuous act: it means "repress" or "occupy," indicating simply that the island had remained a Carian possession.

21. See Büchchner, s.v. "Halicarnassos," cols. 2253–64; Bean and Cook, "The Halicarnassus Peninsula," pp. 85–93. On Alexander: Arr. *Anab.* 1. 20. 2–23. 6; Diod. 17. 23. 4–27. 6.

expect simply to sail into the harbor and seize the city, counting on the defenders to offer little or no opposition, not even to take the elementary precaution of shutting the city gates before the enemy attack? The Rhodian force would have been relatively small and no better equipped to assault a fortified city than any other fourth-century army, and the delay caused by the necessity of storming the walls—assuming it was possible at all—would have allowed Artemisia the time to mobilize her abundant resources and crush the invaders.

As can be seen, the notion of a Rhodian attack on Halicarnassus is in every respect fantastic. If the Rhodians had managed to overthrow the government of Agesilochus, in itself an extremely unlikely event, the only conceivable course of action for the new government would have been the simple defense of the island against any Carian reaction.

In addition to these circumstantial problems, the story also presents a number of internal difficulties. First, the motive attributed to the Rhodians for the attack is inadequate: “indignant mulierem imperare civitatibus Cariae totius.” Second, why were the Rhodians so easily deceived by Artemisia’s ruse; why were their suspicions not aroused by the complete absence of the Carian navy and army and the unexpected willingness of the citizens of Halicarnassus to deliver their city into the hands of former subjects? Third, why did Artemisia employ at all the dangerous stratagem of allowing the enemy into her city, rather than simply shutting them out and defeating or driving off their fleet? Her ruse with the ships, which sounds fictitious, represents precisely the kind of anecdote in which the ancients delighted. If the story were true, her stratagem would deserve a place in the collection of Polyaeus, who does record another anecdote about Artemisia and three stories about Mausolus.²² Finally, there is the topographical problem: not only is Vitruvius’ description difficult to reconcile with the existing terrain, but also the rocky peninsula upon which the royal palace stood does not show the slightest evidence of any port or canal. But surely an artificial harbor large enough to accommodate the Carian fleet ought to have left some trace.²³

That leaves the statuary group described by Vitruvius, which presumably existed, but is not evidence for this particular event. In the first place it is not certain that Artemisia was actually responsible for the piece; the one figure might have personified the Carian state rather than the queen herself, as the other figure personified Rhodes, in which case the group could be assigned to any of the Hecatomnids. Second, if Artemisia was in fact responsible for erecting the statues, she could have had any of a number of reasons, from the celebration of some specific event to the simple depiction of Carian control of Rhodes. The mere existence of the statues does not prove the truth of the circumstances which Vitruvius connects with them. It is even possible that the monument contributed to the development of the story by providing an appropriate core around which it could coalesce.

In any case the Vitruvian anecdote cannot be true. The story is unsupported by any evidence, and it runs counter to every historical probability. A historian must sometimes accept the possibility of an unlikely or improbable action, but in order to accept Vitruvius’ raid he must tolerate a whole string of improbabilities. At

22. Polyaeus. 6. 8; 7. 23. 1–2; 8. 53. 4.

23. For the topographical difficulties, see Bean and Cook, “The Halicarnassus Peninsula,” p. 89; Bean, *Turkey Beyond the Meander*, pp. 112–13.

most, the story (and possibly the statuary) may record some failed attempt of the Rhodians to overthrow the Carian-supported oligarchs.²⁴

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"GIVING DESERTION AS A PRETEXT": THUC. 7. 13. 2

In his letter to the Athenians (Thuc. 7. 11–15), Nicias complains that one of his major problems at Syracuse is the "wasting of the ships' crews." In 13. 2 he details the reasons for these losses.

τὰ δὲ πληρώματα διὰ τόδε ἐφθάρη τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἔτι νῦν φθίρεται, τῶν ναυτῶν [τῶν] μὲν διὰ φρυγανισμόν καὶ ἀρπαγὴν καὶ ὕδρειαν μακρὰν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπολλυμένων· οἱ δὲ θεράποντες, ἐπειδὴ ἐς ἀντίπαλα καθεστήκαμεν, αὐτομολοῦσι, καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνῶμην ναυτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα ὀρώσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται, οἱ δὲ ὥς ἕκαστοι δύνανται (πολλὴ δ' ἡ Σικελία), εἰσὶ δ' οἱ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμπορενόμενοι ἀνδράποδα Ἷτκαρικὰ ἀντεμβιβάζσαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν πείσαντες τοὺς τριηράρχους τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἀφήρηται.

As K. J. Dover¹ says in his note on οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται, the "prima facie meaning is 'giving desertion as a pretext.'" The problem is that desertion hardly seems an excuse likely to convince your superior officer that you should be allowed to leave the ranks: it is the *reason* for leaving, not the pretext.² But none of the many attempts to emend the passage seems likely, much less persuasive.³

Only George Grote appears to have been on the right track in realizing that

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1. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1970), p. 389. See p. 388 for the identification of the sailors mentioned at the beginning of the passage and the deletion of the second τῶν. Nicias means here only Athenian sailors, who are to be distinguished both from the slaves and from the foreigners mentioned later in the sentence.

2. K. Weidauer, *Thukydides und die Hippokratischen Schriften* (Heidelberg, 1954), pp. 16–17, tries to make the Greek say precisely this by having *prophasis* here denote Nicias' explanation of the desertion rather than the deserter's own excuse. He thus translates, "... aus dem Grund, den ich [Nicias] dafür angeben kann, dass sie nämlich überlaufen." On this argument, Thucydides uses *prophasis* here in its "objective," Hippocratic sense. Though I agree that *prophasis* is sometimes used by Thucydides in an objective sense, and indeed have argued this point at length (cf. *A Semantic Study of Prophasis to 400 B.C.*, Hermes Einzelschriften, 33 [Wiesbaden, 1975], esp. chap. 4), I do not believe that 7. 13. 2 is such an instance. On this interpretation no sense can be made of the contrast between οἱ μὲν and οἱ δέ, and the parenthetical "Sicily is a large place" is left unexplained. Weidauer addresses neither of these issues; rather, he treats the phrase completely out of context.

3. See Dover's discussion ad loc. Dover's own interpretation, taken from Pearson (*"Prophasis and Aitia," TAPA 83 [1952]: 215*) is certainly, as he admits, obscure, and, if not impossible, at least very improbable. To translate the phrase as "some deserting to the enemy and others on a variety of pretexts" is surely to do violence to the Greek. Pearson's comment is not helpful: "... there is no pretence about the troops' desertion (what Nicias means is that they are leaving without offering any other reason or pretext)."